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Our review of the evidence found that the notion that higher pay leads to the selection of 
better executives is undermined by the prevalence of poor recruiting methods. Moreover, 
higher pay fails to promote better performance. Instead, it undermines the intrinsic 
motivation of executives, inhibits their learning, leads them to ignore other stakeholders, 
and discourages them from considering the long-term effects of their decisions on 
stakeholders. Relating incentive payments to executives’ actions in an effective manner is 
not possible. Incentives also encourage unethical behaviour. Organizations would benefit 
from using validated methods to hire top executives, reducing compensation, eliminating 
incentive plans, and strengthening stockholder governance related to the hiring and 
compensation of executives.  
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__________________________________________________________________ 
In 2008, Fortune 500 CEOs were paid 185 times more than the average worker 
(DeNavas-Walt et al. 2009). Academics and the general public have questioned the 
justification for such large payments to executives. A Gallup poll conducted in June 2009 
found that 59 percent of a representative sample of 998 Americans favored government 
action to limit executive compensation (Jones 2009).  
 
Problem 
Boards of directors set the compensation of their top executives to attract capable people 
and to encourage them to act in the firm’s interests. In effect, the board must forecast 
which candidates will do the most effective job and how they will respond to the level 
and type of remuneration. This forecasting task is complex because potential executives 
vary on many dimensions, as do firms. The primary method used for this task is unaided 
expert judgment—i.e., unaided by any evidence-based forecasting methods (see 
Armstrong 2001a).  
Decades of research have led to a perplexing finding on unaided judgments: 
beyond a basic minimum, expertise has no value for forecasting outcomes in complex, 
uncertain situations. Nevertheless, people continue to believe experts’ forecasts. This is 
known as the seer-sucker theory: “No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not 
exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers” (Armstrong 1980 p. 2).  
Research since 1980 has added support to the conclusion that unaided judgments 
are unsuitable for management forecasting for complex uncertain situations. In particular, 
see Tetlock’s (2005) analysis of over 82,000 forecasts in a 20-year study of 284 experts, 
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whose professions involve offering advice on political and economic trends. These 
experts barely outperformed laymen in the accuracy of their forecasts, and their forecasts 
were less accurate than those derived from simple decision rules. 
Given the difficulty of learning from experience, recruiters may be unaware of the 
factors affecting their perceptions of job applicants’ suitability. In one experiment, 
participants viewed videotaped job interviews. Unbeknownst to them, professional actors 
wore special prostheses to play overweight job candidates in the experimental condition 
and then played themselves—average-weight candidates—in the control condition. All of 
the participants were presented with the same resumes and job descriptions. When 
participants viewed overweight job candidates, they made more negative inferences about 
them (r = – .45) and reported they would be less willing to hire them (r = – .59) 
(Pingitore et al. 1994). Studies on the beauty premium also show evidence of such bias. 
One study concluded that workers who ranked in the lowest 9 percent in terms of looks 
earned between 7 and 9 percent less than average, whereas workers who ranked in the top 
third earned 5 percent more than the average (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). We are 
unaware of evidence that slim and attractive people are better managers. 
 
Methodology 
We sought experimental and quasi-experimental studies (i.e., analyses of data for which 
key explanatory variables differed, while many but not all other variables were held 
constant) to assess how remuneration motivated managers and affected firm performance. 
Non-experimental data are less useful for assessing causal effects, although we do draw 
on such analyses to some extent. With non-experimental data, the relationship between 
executive pay and firm performance is confounded, because firms with high profits pay 
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higher compensation to CEOs. Analyses of experimental data are preferable for 
identifying causality in such situations involving complexity and uncertainty (Armstrong 
2012a). 
To locate relevant studies, we searched the ABI/Inform, PsychINFO, and SSCI 
databases (search terms: “compensation OR pay AND performance”), examined the 
publication records of researchers whose work is relevant to the questions at hand, 
scanned reference lists of all relevant papers that we obtained, and contacted key 
researchers to ask whether we might have missed relevant sources.  
Academic papers frequently misstate findings in their reviews of prior research 
(Wright and Armstrong 2008). To address this, we contacted authors whose findings we 
summarized in substantive ways. If we received no reply, we followed up with another 
email. In all, we received replies from 80% of the authors whom we contacted. 
Information about the studies is provided in supplementary material to this paper at 
https://www.informs.org/Pubs/Interfaces/Online-Supplements. 
 
Does Higher Pay Lead Firms to Hire More Effective Executives? 
One argument for high executive compensation is that firms must compete for the best 
managers by offering higher pay. This assumes firms use validated selection procedures. 
However, human resources (HR) practitioners hold fallacious views regarding personnel 
selection. For example, intelligence is the single best predictor of job performance 
(Schmidt and Hunter 1998), yet only 18 percent of the 959 HR professionals surveyed by 
Rynes et al. (2002) identified intelligence as a better predictor of job performance than 
conscientiousness. Similarly, when personnel experts in New Zealand and the United 
States were asked to rank the strength of job-performance predictors, the correlation 
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between the experts’ rankings and the evidence-based rankings was close to zero 
(Ahlburg 1992; Dakin and Armstrong 1989). Two surveys of 820 British recruitment 
consultants found that executives are generally selected using unstructured interviews and 
character references, procedures with little validity (Clark 1992). 
 Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of executive recruiting is the failure to 
apply Meehl’s (1954) rule, summarized here as: “You should not meet job candidates 
until you decide to make them an offer.” Instead, Meehl advised the use of linear models 
(e.g., regression analysis). In interviews, irrelevant factors (e.g., height, body build, 
gender, accent and looks) often dominate relevant factors. Additional research has 
continued to support Meehl’s findings (see Grove 2000 for a meta-analysis). 
 Few organizations follow Meehl’s rule. However, its adoption by the Oakland 
Athletics baseball team had an enormous impact. Although the team had a modest 
payroll, it won a high percentage of its games. After initial resistance, other baseball 
teams also adopted these superior prediction methods, as did basketball and football 
teams (Armstrong 2012c). These teams believed they needed to adopt the method to stay 
competitive. Adoption by business firms has been slow; this is unfortunate, because we 
expect that using Meehl’s rule would help all stakeholders.  
Executives are often evaluated on the basis of the success or failure of the 
business unit for which they are responsible. In practice, many internal and external 
factors influence outcomes for firms, and assessing the role played by a given executive 
is not possible. For example, should a manager get credit for a firm's success when the 
economy is booming or blame for the firm's losses during a recession? When answering 
such questions, evaluators are biased toward ignoring contextual factors and overly 
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attributing outcomes to leaders. This bias was illustrated in a laboratory experiment in 
which groups of participants had to solve a coordination task. In the experiment, group 
size varied, and participants could perceive that the task was harder when the group was 
larger. Despite this, participants credited group leaders for the success of small groups 
and blamed them for the failure of large groups (Weber et al. 2001). 
Nonexperimental studies also find that increases in CEO compensation occur 
following increases in firm performance that result from factors beyond the CEO’s 
control—CEOs are paid for being lucky. For example, CEOs in the oil industry were 
compensated for increases profits resulting from fluctuations in the price of crude oil—a 
factor beyond their control (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). 
If the selection procedures do not use evidence-based procedures, then one would 
not expect executive search firms to add benefit over what a firm could do on its own. In 
addition, they can do this at a lower cost given that leading executive search firms charge 
about one-third of the first year’s compensation or roughly one million dollars for each 
CEO hired (Settimi 2008).   
 
Does Higher Pay Lead to Better Performance? 
We present evidence on the relationship between pay and performance, and also examine 
the special case of large financial bonuses. We then discuss the specific structure and 
implications of executive incentive programs.  
Pay and Performance 
One study examined the performance of CEOs after receiving awards, such as CEO of 
the year or top manager, from the press (e.g., Business Week). In the year of the awards, 
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the total compensation of superstar CEO winners increased by 44 percent; however, the 
compensation of all non-winners showed little increase. This also applied to the non-
winners who were most similar to winners based on individual and firm characteristics; 
their compensation closely approximates what the superstar CEOs would have received 
had they not been given the awards. Three years following the awards, the difference in 
total compensation between the superstars and similar CEOs remained substantial. 
However, following the awards, the stocks of firms led by superstar CEOs 
underperformed as their by 15 to 26 percent compared to firms led by similar CEOs in 
the three-year period after the awards (Malmendier and Tate 2009). 
The predominant view among economists is that monetary rewards motivate 
people to perform better.  
Literature reviews (e.g., Prendergast 1999, Gerhart et al. 2009) and a number of 
meta-analyses (e.g., Cameron and Pierce 1994, Eisenberger and Cameron 1996) support 
the positive effect of pay on performance.   
One meta-analysis examined the relationship between pay and performance 
across 39 laboratory and field experiments. Pay had no effect on performance in terms of 
quality, but did affect performance measures in terms of quantity (r = .34), leading the 
authors to conclude that their results, along with similar results from previous meta-
analyses, went “a long way towards dispelling the myth that financial incentives erode 
intrinsic motivation” (Jenkins et al. 1998, p. 784).  
In contrast, psychologists tend to argue that the relationship between monetary 
rewards and performance depends on the situation Especially important is the distinction 
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between extrinsic motivation (rewards) and intrinsic motivation (satisfaction in doing the 
task).   
A meta-analysis of 128 experiments concluded that extrinsic rewards undermine 
intrinsic motivation (Deci et al. 1999). Previous meta-analyses had reached similar 
conclusions (Rummel and Feinberg 1988, Tang and Hall 1995, Wiersma 1992). The Deci 
et al. meta-analysis corrected for a number of shortcomings in some of the meta-analyses 
we cited in support of the economists’ view on incentives (i.e., Cameron and Pierce 1994, 
Eisenberger and Cameron 1996). For example, Cameron and Pierce (1994) omitted 
almost 20 percent of relevant studies, misclassified certain studies, and most importantly, 
did not consider relevant conditions (e.g., whether the tasks were inherently motivating).  
Deci et al.’s meta-analysis of 128 laboratory experiments further examined the 
relationship between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation by considering a number 
of moderating conditions. When rewards were tangible, expected, and contingent on 
performance—as they are for executives—the correlation between rewards and intrinsic 
motivation was -0.28 (based on 32 studies). The decrease in motivation was even greater 
when rewards were tangible, expected, and contingent on completion (i.e., when rewards 
were given only to those doing very well); the correlation, based on 19 studies, was -0.44 
(Deci et al. 1999). Literature reviews (e.g., Frey and Jegen 2001) also support the 
detrimental effect of incentives on motivation and performance. 
A meta-analysis involving 46 laboratory and field experiments that controlled for 
the nature of the tasks found a negative relationship between tangible rewards and 
performance for interesting tasks (i.e., tasks perceived as challenging, enjoyable or 
purposeful), and a positive relationship between tangible rewards and performance for 
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less interesting tasks (Weibel et al. 2010). For example, there was a positive relationship 
between tangible rewards and performance for a simple task like installing automobile 
windows (Lazear 2000); however, there was a negative relationship for difficult and/or 
interesting tasks like resolving complex mathematical problems (Mowen et al. 1981). 
[Better example, Phil?] Specifically, the correlation between monetary rewards and work 
performance was positive (r = 0.42) for simple or boring tasks, but negative (r = -0.13) 
for interesting or difficult tasks. Five experiments examined how performance was 
affected by the use of incentives and by how severely non-optimal answers were 
sanctioned. With incentives participants were more concerned with evaluating how well 
they were doing than with understanding how the task should be done, leading to poorer 
performance for more complex tasks (Hogarth et al. 1991). 
Incentive Systems 
The second author of this paper started his career as an engineer and was involved with 
designing incentive payments for repetitive tasks that require little thinking. This was 
used only when it was possible to tie individual efforts directly to outcomes in situations 
in which other factors have negligible effects. These systems also require extremely 
accurate performance measures. Once in place, it was common for workers to falsify 
their productivity accounts to increase their pay. In addition, conditions change over time 
so that incentives frequently need updating. Workers point out changes that call for 
increased effort, but those that reduce effort (the more common situation). Engineers did 
not believe that incentive standards were possible for even the first level of supervision.  
Consider the effects of particularly large financial incentives. In a field 
experiment, participants completed tasks requiring creativity, attention, concentration, 
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and memory, and were randomly informed that exceptional performance would be 
rewarded by a small, medium, or large financial bonus (i.e., equivalent salary for a day, 
two weeks, or five months, respectively). Participants in the medium-bonus condition did 
not perform better than participants in the small-bonus condition; participants in the 
large-bonus condition performed the poorest (Ariely et al. 2009). When researchers 
replicated this experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor 
participants’ brain activity, they found that the prospect of obtaining larger-than-average 
rewards engaged a relatively large share of attention and working memory, leaving little 
available to effectively carry out tasks (Mobbs et al. 2009).  
 
Incentive plans can be detrimental to the interests of shareholders when the plans 
focus on short-term performance at the expense of long-term profitability. See Bebchuk 
and Fried (2010) for a review. Additionally, incentive systems may affect executives in 
unintended ways. Increased emphasis on profits or on any other single measure is likely 
to lead to reduced emphasis and even detrimental effects on other measures (Slovic and 
MacPhillamy 1974), such as the treatment of other stakeholders. For example, in a 
laboratory experiment, participants were asked if they would be willing to keep a 
profitable drug, Panalba, on the market in the face of overwhelming evidence that it was 
killing patients. They were told that drugs made by competitors provided the same 
benefits without causing fatalities. When playing the role of top executives and board 
members, no group removed the drug from the market. The participants were adhering to 
their task of increasing profits. However, groups that were asked to also consider the 
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drug's effects on stakeholders and were given estimates of these effects were more likely 
to withdraw the drug (Armstrong 1977).  
Financial incentives can lead to undesirable behaviors by executives. In a series of 
experiments on ethical behavior, financial incentives weakened or outweighed the 
participants’ sense of moral self-identity. For example, participants were more likely to 
lie in an actual negotiation when personal financial incentives were involved (Aquino et 
al. 2009).  
Incentive plans are likely to temp executives to engage in fraudulent behavior. For 
example, school superintendents in Philadelphia were asked to improve their students’ 
standardized test scores. Some superintendents were highly successful and were sought 
after by other schools. However, the key factor to their success was that they put a 
program in place to erase wrong answers on student exams and insert correct answers 
(Russ 2012).  
Yermack (1997) noticed a pattern in which stock options grants for CEO 
coincided with favorable movements in the stock price. The fraudulent nature of this 
became clear years when Lie (2005) examined almost 6,000 CEO stock option awards 
granted between 1992 and 2002 and found stock options were often granted on the day 
when the value of these options would be maximized.  
 
Possible Solutions 
We discuss four improvements in executive compensation: (1) use evidence-based 
procedures for the selection and compensation of top executives; (2) reduce executive 
pay; (3) eliminate incentive payments for executives; and (4) improve corporate 
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governance by giving stockholders more control over the hiring, retention, and 
compensation of top executives.  
Use Evidence-Based Methods for Selection, Compensation, and Promotion 
A meta-analysis of 85 years of research on employee selection found that general mental 
ability (intelligence) is the single-best predictor of job performance, especially in jobs 
involving decision-making in complex situations (Schmidt and Hunter 1998). These data 
are non-experimental, and range restriction applies because people generally apply only 
for jobs for which they think they are capable. Schmidt and Hunter found that the number 
of years of education was not correlated to long-term job performance when the analysis 
controlled for the effect of cognitive abilities (e.g., IQ). A review of experimental studies, 
also reached this conclusion (Armstrong 2012b).  
Biases can be avoided by making observers blind to irrelevant candidate 
characteristics. A study of symphonic orchestra auditions found that when applicants 
performed behind a screen, the probability that female candidates passed preliminary 
rounds of recruitment increased by 50 percent (Goldin and Rouse 2000).  
Much evidence exists about factors that affect job performance. This information 
should be used in a structured fashion to improve reliability and to help control for biases. 
When many important variables and good knowledge about the directional effects of the 
variables are present, index models allow the use of all prior information in a simple 
manner (see Armstrong and Graefe 2011 for evidence). Index models require only an 
assessment of the directional impact of each variable on the criterion, such as assigning a 
score of +1 (-1) if a variable has a positive (negative) effect on the criterion of interest. 
The sum of the scores serves as the predictive index—highest score wins.  
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Given the difficulty of developing objective performance measures for executives, 
judgmental bootstrapping offers a way to improve an expert’s predictions. Used in the 
early 1900s to forecast agricultural crop yields, this method was applied successfully to 
personnel predictions and other management problems in the latter part of the 20th 
century (Armstrong 2001b). By using an experimental design with artificially created 
data (to avoid inter-correlation among the predictor variables), one can develop a model 
by regressing an expert’s forecasts on the variables used. For example, the expert 
forecasts the success of 50 applicants, and his forecasts are regressed against the 
information provided to the expert. Validation studies have shown that the model’s 
predictions are almost always more accurate than those the expert provided because the 
model applies the expert’s rules more consistently. This approach can also identify when 
the expert is using irrelevant variables. 
Sealed bids, a commonly used market-based procedure for hiring contractors of 
all types, might be considered for hiring top executives. Applicants using sealed bids 
would describe what they could do for the organization, what relevant skills they have 
(and support for their claims), how much they would require in remuneration, how long a 
contract they would need, and whether they would require any payments should they be 
asked to resign. The proposals would be cleaned to eliminate information that does not 
relate clearly to job performance (e.g., gender, race, religion, weight, height, voice or 
looks). The bids would then be sent to a screening committee who would make blind, 
independent ratings using a structured rating sheet.  
Candidates who pass the initial screening would then go to an assessment center, 
where traits (e.g., cognitive abilities, values, and self-control) would be evaluated. In one 
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study, 382 top executives (e.g., CEOs, presidents, board chairpersons and controllers) 
completed an assessment of their values. They were then given an in-basket exercise for 
their decisions prior to leaving on a business trip. The tasks included descriptions of 
seven situations in which they could earn higher profits by using fraudulent accounting 
practices. Overall, they used fraudulent reports in 44 percent of their decisions. 
Interestingly, those who placed a high value on self-respect were less likely to make 
fraudulent decisions than those who placed a high value on extrinsic rewards. (Brief et al. 
1996). 
Assessment centers would also include evaluations of skills, such as the ability to 
use evidence-based techniques for running effective meetings, analyzing data, listening to 
others, writing persuasive reports, and developing strategic plans. These results could be 
entered into an index model to identify the leading candidates.  
Current procedures for selecting CEOs seem to rely heavily on the use of 
analogies. For example, “Ms. X was successful in running division A in company B, so 
she should do well in running our company because it is in a similar business.” Analogies 
can produce useful forecasts if used as inputs to forecasts (Green and Armstrong 2007). 
This suggests that organizations should look for suitable candidates among those 
currently working in the organization. An internal candidate’s performance would be 
more relevant given the similarities of domain knowledge, job function, product line, 
company culture and managerial style.  In addition, peers, subordinates, and superiors can 
rate internal candidates.  
One study compared the performance of external hires against that of internal 
employees promoted to similar positions within a US investment banking division 
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between 2003 and 2009. Although the external hires had more experience and education, 
and were paid 15 percent more in the two years following their recruitment, they 
performed worse on the job and were more likely to leave the company, as opposed to 
employees recruited internally (Bidwell 2011). Harris and Helfat (1997) also found that 
externally hired CEOs were paid more than CEOs promoted internally. 
A policy of hiring from within might lead ambitious people to identify more 
closely with the firm and motivate them to prove their importance to the firm rather than 
trying to attract outside offers. Promotion from within has been used with apparent 
success by family-run firms, churches, the military, and many for-profit firms. We 
suspect that it is the dominant approach used by small firms. Many CEOs take pride in 
developing people to succeed them. We will not bother to mention examples such as 
Apple, which lost their way when they hired outsiders as CEOs. 
Reduce the Compensation of Top Executives 
Given the lack of evidence favoring high pay and the evidence on its detrimental 
effects, we conclude that compensation of top executives should gradually be reduced. 
Given the nature of the job (and the status associated with the position), many capable 
people would accept a modest salary for a top management position. Indeed, cooperatives 
and voluntary organizations often offer low salaries, yet they have no difficulty in finding 
top executives.  
Eliminate Incentive Payments to Executives 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) supported a movement toward incentive payments for top 
management with an influential study (as of mid-2013, Google Scholar showed more 
than 5,000 citations for this paper). They argued that compensation should be designed to 
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motivate those in top management to serve the firm, rather than their own interests. They 
suggested three guidelines: (1) require that CEOs hold a substantial amount of company 
stock, (2) make the levels and structure of compensation sensitive to firm performance, 
and (3) fire CEOs for poor performance. No experimental evidence was provided to 
support these guidelines. 
Improve Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance plays an important role in keeping executive compensation in 
check. For example, in the aforementioned study of CEO compensation in the oil 
industry (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), pay for luck was 23 to 33 percent lower in 
firms where CEO power was weaker because of the presence of a large investor on the 
board.  
A study of how CEO compensation changed in response to luck (i.e., events 
affecting firm performance beyond the CEO’s control) between 1992 and 2011 showed 
that pay was about 25 percent higher when luck favored the CEO. However, this effect 
was evident only in poorly governed firms. (Garvey and Milbourn 2006). 
Similarly, in the superstar CEO study, the deleterious effects following awards to 
CEOs were most pronounced in in which management was more entrenched or 
shareholder protection was weaker (Malmendier and Tate 2009).  
A study of CEO incentive payments in over 1,000 firms between 1992 and 2003 
found that the extent to which CEOs had power over their boards explained between 10 
and 30 percent of the variance in incentive pay and performance. Furthermore, greater 
CEO power was associated with decreased firm value and performance during that period 
(Morse et al. 2011).  
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One study found that opportunistic timing of option grants was more likely in 
firms with weaker corporate governance. This was measured by whether or not a firm's 
board had a majority of independent directors, by whether or not the firm's compensation 
committee included an outside shareholder with a large number of shares, and by the 
length of CEO tenure (Bebchuk et al. 2010). 
Studies of anti-takeover legislation show evidence that executive compensation 
increases with executive power. Following these anti-takeover legislations, which 
entrenched management, compensation levels increased, particularly among white-collar 
workers, and the firm's market value diminished (Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999, 
2003). The effects of weakened corporate governance on executive compensation can 
spread to other firms because peer-group benchmarking is often used to set executive 
compensation. Consider the Delaware court rulings that strengthened firms’ anti-takeover 
legislations. These court rulings led not only to a substantial increase in CEO 
compensation for firms incorporated in Delaware. It also affected firms outside Delaware 
because they used the CEO compensation of their competitors in Delaware as a 
benchmarks to set the compensation of their CEOs (Bereskin and Cicero 2012). 
Following corporate scandals in the early 2000s, US stock exchanges issued board 
requirements to limit the power of CEOs. A quasi-experimental study examined how this 
change in corporate governance affected CEO pay by observing changes in compensation 
between firms already following these requirements and firms that were not. These 
requirements reduced CEO pay between 2000 and 2005 in a sample of 865 firms listed in 
the S&P 1500 index. Furthermore, CEO compensation was 17 percent lower in firms that 
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were more affected by these requirements compared to firms that were already generally 
complying with these requirements (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009).  
In a study examining the relationship between management entrenchment and a 
firm's financial performance between 1990 and 2003, entrenchment was found to 
correlate negatively with firm valuation, as measured both by stock returns and the firm's 
estimated worth. Entrenchment was measured by an index based on the following 
provisions: “staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter 
amendments” (Bebchuk et al. 2009, p. 783). 
 
A natural field experiment in corporate governance can be found in the Basque 
region of Spain where the democratically run Mondragon Cooperative Corporation 
(Mondragon) is based. The “Mondragon experiment” began with a single cooperative in 
1956 and grew to 256 organizations employing over 100,000 people by 2012. From 1996 
to 2008, its sales increased by more than 213 percent, while sales in conventional firms 
operating in the same sectors in Spain increased by only 140 percent.  
The ownership of firms in the Mondragon cooperative is vested in the employees 
who elect their own managers. The governing council is effectively a board of directors 
that is responsible for electing the CEO and for approving the CEO’s choice of senior 
executives. Indeed, the top executives have no vote on the governing council. In effect, 
the owners control the process. The general idea is to promote from within, because the 
employee-owners have excellent knowledge about the candidates. The top executive is a 
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servant to those in the organization. If those in the organization believe they are being 
poorly served, they can replace the executive. 
CEOs in Mondragon receive no incentive payments. The compensation of the 
highest-paid employee is set to a maximum of 8.9 times that of the least-paid employee 
(this ratio has increased after many years to retain top managers in response to market 
pressures). If all sources of compensation are included, this ratio is currently 11:1.  
The Mondragon ratio is higher than the 5:1 maximum ratio used by most 
cooperatives (Arando et al. 2011). Because of these salary differential restrictions, if the 
CEO should receive a salary increase, then all employees would receive a commensurate 
salary increase.  
Some US companies follow similar guidelines. For example, at Whole Foods, the 
maximum top salary is currently set at 18 times the average salary (Sutherland 2013). 
These companies seem to have no problem attracting people willing to become their 
CEOs. The case of Mondragon suggests that firms and their stockholders might benefit 
from introducing at least some degree of employee ownership.  
An organization that does not find the evidence to date persuasive might consider 
what evidence would lead them to make changes. They could then search for such 
evidence, commission an experiment, or try alternative approaches. 
 
Conclusions 
High pay levels do not lead to the selection of more effective managers. One reason is 
that executive recruiters often fail to use evidence-based selection procedures. This 
includes failure to use valid indicators of job performance and failure to use evidence-
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based methods, such as regression analysis, judgmental bootstrapping, and the index 
method. Particularly important to removing bias, the decisions should be made prior to 
meeting the potential candidates (Meehl’s rule).  
High levels of executive pay have not been shown to lead to better performance. 
Given this, owners should consider paying lower levels of remuneration to top 
executives. One way to implement this is to provide an open search with a preference for 
hiring from within the firm, and invite applicants to submit sealed bids on the positions.   
Incentive payments are inappropriate for top executives. They lead executives to 
focus on invalid measures, reducing their ability to learn and encouraging unethical 
behavior. 
Weak corporate governance allows CEOs to increase their compensation. 
Stockholders should have greater control over selection and remuneration procedures.  
When it comes to executive selection and remuneration, a stark contrast exists 
between experimental findings and current practice.  
 
Online Supplement 
An online supplement to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be 
found at https://www.informs.org/Pubs/Interfaces/Online-Supplements. 
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